In a first experiment Tortosa et al. In the current research we used a modified version of this trust game procedure and incorporated the Canadas et al. The task typically involves two players, a trustor and a trustee. If the trustee then reciprocates, the sum is divided between the two players; otherwise the trustor obtains nothing.
Still, substantial amounts of trust are observed across studies Berg et al. Importantly in our adaptation of the procedure, each participant was presented with two categories of faces i. Also, as in Canadas et al.
A second and more important aim of our study is to evaluate whether participants individuate, or rather categorize, that is, the extent to which participant behave in the same way with all category members, irrespectively of whether they show a consistent or inconsistent cooperation rate with rest of the category members. In case of categorization, the same decision e.
On the contrary, participants will individuate to the extent that their decisions are taken accordingly to the reciprocation rate associated to each individual face rather than to the ethnic-category. Therefore, in case of individuation, inconsistent individuals will be show different cooperation patterns than consistent faces. We expected that along the block of trials, participants would use the facial features to categorize individuals according to the more salient features of their faces i.
Thus, participants would share in greater extent with the individuals of the group more likely to reciprocate. However, we expected this to happen mainly for consistent individuals. A different prediction was made for inconsistent individuals. On the one hand, and according to our previous research by Canadas et al. Foregoing research has demonstrated that people attempting to maximize their benefits should learn from the feedback displayed after the interactions with the environment reinforcement learning— Sutton and Barto, and consequently in our study individuation is a more efficient strategy.
This strategy then should be learned quickly after the feedback of each interaction Axelrod and Hamilton, Taken all together, both the individualistic nature of this task and the explicit consequences of each decision participants were informed about whether the partner reciprocated or not in each trial , we expected that participant would pay attention to each individual and therefore would individuate inconsistent partners, updating first impressions based on previous interactions Chang et al.
This individuation pattern i. Twenty-six undergraduate white students from the University of Granada one man, mean age The study was conformed to the relevant regulatory standards approved by the local ethics committee of the University of Granada in the Department of Experimental Psychology.
At the beginning of the session, participants were instructed that the experiment explored the cooperation patterns that emerge between people during the so-called trust game. Deciding to keep the money would yield no earnings for the partner and would end the trial.
If participants decide to share, it would result in 5 euros given to the trustee , who, in turn, would decide whether: a to reciprocate the cooperation, and each of them would receive 2. This feedback about the trustee decision was displayed on the computer screen ms after the participant took the decision and the trial ended after the feedback. Participants were also informed that they were not playing with real people but that the reciprocity behavior would mimic common patterns of play by real people.
Therefore they were unaware of the main goal of the study, which was to explore how the ethnicity of the partners can influence strategies of cooperation, and to investigate whether participants categorize vs. The general procedure was similar to that used by Tortosa et al. The task was presented on a PC running E-prime software Schneider et al. Stimuli were frontal photographs of eight black people four men and four women and eight white people four men—four women from Nimstim face stimulus set Tottenham et al.
Faces were matched on attractiveness and trustworthiness as reported by 28 independent participants 10 men and 18 women, all whites; mean aged All stimuli were presented against a gray background see Figure 1. After participants informed of their decision or after ms in case they did not so , the picture was replaced by the fixation point for ms and then replaced by a symbolic feedback symbol 1. You receive 1 euro. On trials where participants did not enter their decision on time 1.
Participant played a multi-round design, with 16 different trustees over the course of the task. Participants played this game 40 times with each of the 16 trustees for a total of trials divided in two phases of five blocks each. These were consistent faces. The forth face of each group in each phase reciprocated at the rate of the other group. These were inconsistent faces. In the second phase the group reciprocation rate was inversed using four different faces for each ethnic group.
Which face of the group acted as inconsistent face was also counterbalanced across participants. For instance, for a given participant, five blocks constituted the first phase.
In a second phase of five extra blocks, eight new faces were presented and the reciprocation rates were inversed for the ethnic groups. The interaction showed that the effect of group reciprocation rate which was opposite for inconsistent faces increased across blocks, as learning increased.
This makes evident the reinforcement learning hypothesis Chang et al. As the same cooperation responses for consistent and inconsistent faces can be conceived as a sign of categorization , and opposite cooperation behaviors for consistent vs. Figure 2. We checked for individual differences of the faces.
Specifically, first we wanted to evaluate how the trust game task could have affected judgments of attractiveness and trustworthiness of the trustees. We then performed a repeated measure analysis two group reciprocation rate by two ethnicity by two face consistency on each dependent variable. We next evaluated how participants perceived the faces at a group level.
We first analyzed how frequently participant believed that the two groups of faces blacks and whites were presented during the task. This result indicates that participants correctly estimated that all faces were equally presented throughout the experiment. The present study explored the effect of ethnicity and consistent vs. We wanted to explore whether ethnicity moderates the decision of whether to cooperate with partners or not and, more importantly, whether social categorization or individuation processes would underlie those decisions.
Results revealed that participants did not show a particular bias toward cooperating with white compared to black in general, although, interestingly, they used different strategies to make decisions about how to cooperate share money or not with white and black partners. Even though preferences to cooperate with ingroup members more than with outgroup members have been largely reported in previous research Wilson and Kayatani, ; Tanis and Postmes, ; Chang et al.
This finding is in line with previous results by Stanley et al. We can rule out the possibility that black and white trustees evoked different trustworthiness impression, as we controlled for this among other variables, e. The evaluation of the trustworthiness of the stimuli at the end of the trust game did not show either overall differences between black and white trustees, which go in line with the pretest and with other studies investigating ethnic attitudes Phelps et al.
A potential explanation for the similar cooperation toward partners belonging to both ethnic groups can be due to the use of women and men as stimuli. It may exist a confound between these two groups, so participants prefer to cooperate with women more as they are perceived more trustworthy than men independently of their ethnic categorization, Buchan et al.
This is surely a confound factor that should be carefully analyzed by future research. Interestingly, the manipulation of consistency significantly affected the evaluation of trustworthiness, which may explain the current results in our study. The different evaluation of inconsistent black and white faces being the former more positively evaluated regarding trustworthiness than the later may evidence that people accepted more ingroup members whites that behave unexpectedly compared to outgroup members blacks; Kosic et al.
Our main contribution to the study of ethnic categories and decision-making literature focuses on the study of cooperation strategies related to categorization and individuation processes. Result showed that white participants used different strategies to make decisions on how to cooperate share money with white and black partners. Specially, they learnt which face is behaving inconsistently with the rest of the group and decided how to cooperate with this person accordingly to the specific cooperation rate that he or she showed.
That is, participants individuate each trustee they were encountering with. Interestingly, however, this individuation strategy applied exclusively to black faces outgroup members. Contrary, decisions to cooperate toward white trustees followed a categorization strategy. If you learn that your new next-door neighbor is a lawyer, for example, you can start to form an impression just on the basis of this category membership. Membership in some categories is based on very clear criteria e.
There is no strict criterion for being a nerd, for example. However, a set of characteristics seems typical of nerds, resulting in a mental image, or prototype, of the category. Even in the case in which there are clear criteria, resemblance to a mental image of the category may still be important.
Whether discussing people, objects, or events, categories are essential for mental functioning. Without them, people would not be able to make sense of the complex, multifaceted environment around them. By grouping similar items into categories, the world acquires structure and meaningfulness. This process of organizing and structuring the world into categories involves two related processes.
If you found yourself lost in a city, you might look for a police officer or a taxi driver to help you find your way. In this case, social categorization would probably be useful because a police officer or a taxi driver might be particularly likely to know the layout of the city streets. Of course, using social categories will only be informative to the extent that the stereotypes held by the individual about that category are accurate.
If police officers were actually not that knowledgeable about the city layout, then using this categorization heuristic would not be informative. The description of social categorization as a heuristic is also true in another sense: we sometimes categorize others not because it seems to provide more information about them but because we may not have the time or the motivation to do anything more thorough.
According to this approach, thinking about other people in terms of their social category memberships is a functional way of dealing with the world—things are complicated, and we reduce complexity by relying on our stereotypes. Although thinking about others in terms of their social category memberships has some potential benefits for the person who does the categorizing, categorizing others, rather than treating them as unique individuals with their own unique characteristics, has a wide variety of negative, and often very unfair, outcomes for those who are categorized.
One problem is that social categorization distorts our perceptions such that we tend to exaggerate the differences between people from different social groups while at the same time perceiving members of groups and particularly outgroups as more similar to each other than they actually are. This overgeneralization makes it more likely that we will think about and treat all members of a group the same way.
Tajfel and Wilkes performed a simple experiment that provided a picture of the potential outcomes of categorization. As you can see in Figure In one of the experimental conditions, participants simply saw six lines, whereas in the other condition, the lines were systematically categorized into two groups—one comprising the three shorter lines and one comprising the three longer lines.
Lines C and D were seen as the same length in the noncategorized condition, but line C was perceived as longer than line D when the lines were categorized into two groups. From Tajfel Tajfel found that the lines were perceived differently when they were categorized, such that the differences between the groups and the similarities within the groups were emphasized.
Specifically, he found that although lines C and D which are actually the same length were perceived as equal in length when the lines were not categorized, line D was perceived as being significantly longer than line C in the condition in which the lines were categorized.
Similar effects occur when we categorize other people. We tend to see people who belong to the same social group as more similar than they actually are, and we tend to judge people from different social groups as more different than they actually are.
Patricia Linville and Edward Jones gave research participants a list of trait terms and asked them to think about either members of their own group e. The results of these studies, as well as other studies like them, were clear: people perceive outgroups as more homogeneous than their ingroup. Just as White people used fewer piles of traits to describe Blacks than Whites, young people used fewer piles of traits to describe elderly people than they did young people, and students used fewer piles for members of other universities than they did for members of their own university.
This prevents us from really learning about the outgroup members as individuals, and as a result, we tend to be unaware of the differences among the group members. Once we begin to see the members of outgroups as more similar to each other than they actually are, it then becomes very easy to apply our stereotypes to the members of the groups without having to consider whether the characteristic is actually true of the particular individual. If men think that women are all alike, then they may also think that they all have the same positive and negative characteristics e.
And women may have similarly simplified beliefs about men e. The outcome is that the stereotypes become linked to the group itself in a set of mental representations Figure Our stereotypes and prejudices are learned through many different processes. This multiplicity of causes is unfortunate because it makes stereotypes and prejudices even more likely to form and harder to change.
And there is often good agreement about the stereotypes of social categories among the individuals within a given culture. In one study assessing stereotypes, Stephanie Madon and her colleagues Madon et al. The participants tended to agree about what traits were true of which groups, and this was true even for groups of which the respondents were likely to never have met a single member Arabs and Russians. Even today, there is good agreement about the stereotypes of members of many social groups, including men and women and a variety of ethnic groups.
Once they become established, stereotypes like any other cognitive representation tend to persevere. We begin to respond to members of stereotyped categories as if we already knew what they were like.
Yaacov Trope and Eric Thompson found that individuals addressed fewer questions to members of categories about which they had strong stereotypes as if they already knew what these people were like and that the questions they did ask were likely to confirm the stereotypes they already had. In other cases, stereotypes are maintained because information that confirms our stereotypes is better remembered than information that disconfirms them.
If we believe that women are bad drivers and we see a woman driving poorly, then we tend to remember it, but when we see a woman who drives particularly well, we tend to forget it.
This illusory correlation is another example of the general principle of assimilation—we tend to perceive the world in ways that make it fit our existing beliefs more easily than we change our beliefs to fit the reality around us.
And stereotypes become difficult to change because they are so important to us—they become an integral and important part of our everyday lives in our culture. Stereotypes are frequently expressed on TV, in movies, and in social media, and we learn a lot of our beliefs from these sources. In short, stereotypes and prejudice are powerful largely because they are important social norms that are part of our culture Guimond, Because stereotypes and prejudice often operate out of our awareness, and also because people are frequently unwilling to admit that they hold them, social psychologists have developed methods for assessing them indirectly.
One difficulty in measuring stereotypes and prejudice is that people may not tell the truth about their beliefs. Most people do not want to admit—either to themselves or to others—that they hold stereotypes or that they are prejudiced toward some social groups. To get around this problem, social psychologists make use of a number of techniques that help them measure these beliefs more subtly and indirectly.
Interestingly, people express more prejudice when they are in the bogus pipeline than they do when they are asked the same questions more directly, which suggests that we may frequently mask our negative beliefs in public. Other indirect measures of prejudice are also frequently used in social psychological research; for instance, assessing nonverbal behaviors such as speech errors or physical closeness. People who sit farther away are assumed to be more prejudiced toward the members of the group.
In these procedures, participants are asked to make a series of judgments about pictures or descriptions of social groups and then to answer questions as quickly as they can, but without making mistakes. In the IAT, participants are asked to classify stimuli that they view on a computer screen into one of two categories by pressing one of two computer keys, one with their left hand and one with their right hand.
For instance, in one version of the IAT, participants are shown pictures of men and women and are also shown words related to academic disciplines e. The basic assumption is that if two concepts are associated or linked, they will be responded to more quickly if they are classified using the same, rather than different, keys. Implicit association procedures such as the IAT show that even participants who claim that they are not prejudiced do seem to hold cultural stereotypes about social groups.
Even Black people themselves respond more quickly to positive words that are associated with White rather than Black faces on the IAT, suggesting that they have subtle racial prejudice toward their own racial group.
Because they hold these beliefs, it is possible—although not guaranteed—that they may use them when responding to other people, creating a subtle and unconscious type of discrimination. Do you hold implicit prejudices? Although in some cases the stereotypes that are used to make judgments might actually be true of the individual being judged, in many other cases they are not. Stereotyping is problematic when the stereotypes we hold about a social group are inaccurate overall, and particularly when they do not apply to the individual who is being judged Stangor, Stereotyping others is simply unfair.
Even if many women are more emotional than are most men, not all are, and it is not right to judge any one woman as if she is. Once we believe that men make better leaders than women, we tend to behave toward men in ways that makes it easier for them to lead. And we behave toward women in ways that makes it more difficult for them to lead. The result? Of course, you may think that you personally do not behave in these ways, and you may not.
But research has found that stereotypes are often used out of our awareness, which makes it very difficult for us to correct for them. Furthermore, attempting to prevent our stereotype from coloring our reactions to others takes effort. Our stereotypes influence not only our judgments of others but also our beliefs about ourselves, and even our own performance on important tasks.
In some cases, these beliefs may be positive, and they have the effect of making us feel more confident and thus better able to perform tasks.
On the other hand, sometimes these beliefs are negative, and they create negative self-fulfilling prophecies such that we perform more poorly just because of our knowledge about the stereotypes. Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson tested the hypothesis that these differences might be due to the activation of negative stereotypes. Steele and Aronson argued that thinking about negative stereotypes that are relevant to a task that one is performing creates stereotype threat — performance decrements that are caused by the knowledge of cultural stereotypes.
That is, they argued that the negative impact of race on standardized tests may be caused, at least in part, by the performance situation itself. Spontaneous Message Processing.
Thoughtful Message Processing. Preventing Persuasion. Creating Insufficient Justification and Overjustification. Cognitive Dissonance in Everyday Life.
Positive Self-Esteem Reduces Dissonance. Perceiving Others Chapter Learning Objectives. Trying to explain murders: Do people from different cultures see things the same way? Initial Impression Formation Learning Objectives. Nonverbal Behavior. Judging People by Their Traits. Combining Traits: Information Integration.
Making Inferences about Personality. Detecting the Covariation between Personality and Behavior. Attributions for Success and Failure Key Takeaways. Biases in Attribution Learning Objectives. Are Our Attributions Accurate? The Fundamental Attribution Error. The Actor-Observer Bias. Self-Serving Biases. Group-Serving Biases. Victim-Blaming Biases Key Takeaways.
Influencing and Conforming Chapter Learning Objectives. Genocide via Conformity? Research Focus: Imitation as Subtle Conformity. Majority Influence: Conforming to the Group. Minority Influence: Resisting Group Pressure. Situational Determinants of Conformity.
The Size of the Majority. The Unanimity of the Majority. Obedience, Power, and Leadership Learning Objectives. Types of Power. Reward Power. Coercive Power. Legitimate Power. Referent Power. Leaders and Leadership. Personality and Leadership. Person Differences. Gender Differences.
Cultural Differences. Psychological Reactance Key Takeaways.
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