This is important, because it is the function of theories to categorize manifestations of a specific phenomenon so as to identify and understand common features and dynamics. Scholars have developed different lists of institutional features to define a federal system.
One of the authoritative lists, drawn up by Ronald Watts, requires 1 two orders of government acting directly on their citizens, 2 a formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and the allocation of revenue sources ensuring genuine autonomy for each order, 3 representation of regional views within the federal institutions, by preference in a federal second chamber, 4 a supreme written and entrenched constitution, requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units through assent of their legislatures or by referendum majorities, 5 an umpire in the form of courts or provision for referendums, 6 processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaborations 7.
Other defining properties are frequently added, such as second chambers 8 , or subnational constitutional autonomy 9. Belgium does not have two orders of government that act directly on their citizens with legislative authority, but three: the federal government, the Communities and the Regions. Amending the constitution does not require the consent of the federated entities or referendum majorities. It does require a two third majority in the Senate, but this was turned into a chamber of the sub-states long after the constitution proclaimed Belgium to be a federal state.
Still today, not all federated units are adequately represented in this chamber, and its powers are so few that it is unable to give voice to the regional views in federal decision-making Also, the federated units do not have prominent powers to adopt their own constitution In fact, few systems show all the properties demanded by traditional theory.
These old-school models have two features in common: they are mono-national systems, and they were established after the unification of formerly independent states or colonies However, a theory exclusively based on these models, disregards common characteristics of new models — for example, residuary powers with the central authority, or no or underdeveloped subnational constitutional autonomy.
Moreover, it is not able to deal with the most urgent challenges of contemporary multi-tiered systems — the same challenges Belgium is struggling with — which is how to accommodate multinationalism without fueling instability and separation threats This implied definition gives us insight in the characteristics of specific federations, rather than what federalism in its essence is about.
As a result, traditional theory merely teaches us how to copy the design of a particular federal state or the average of a set of particular states. More so: it shows us how to become this state the way it was organized at some particular moment.
Basically, traditional theory neglects the fact that institutional features — in new and old school models — are part of a package deal, rather than essential properties This is especially the case in Belgium: the current system did not result from a visionary and coherent plan developed by the founding fathers.
Instead, it is a bric-a-brac with new elements added after each state reform, dependent upon what was possible in the political constellation of that moment. The result of this neglect is a fixation on specific instruments, which means that we are missing out on alternative and potentially more effective mechanisms and procedures. In Belgium, bicameralism was preserved on the pretext that this is what defines a federal state. However, executive-based institutions are more effective for securing subnational interests in federal decision-making This is especially the case if the second chamber is designed the Belgian way — not representative of the Communities and Regions in a first stage, and more representative but powerless after the sixth state reform.
Traditional federal theory is unable to categorize global multilevel constructs such as the European Union, and neglects how such constructs influence power relations of central and subnational authorities within national compound systems At the same time, it fails to grasp the dynamics between supranational, national, regional and local levels of authority. Several systems — South Africa and Brazil to name but a few — expressly recognize local entities as a third order in a system of co-government This creates dynamics of its own.
For example, it has been pointed out in the literature that local decentralization is sometimes used to weaken regional levels of government By contrast, scholars are surprisingly firm and unanimous as to which properties define confederations. Confederations are treaty-based systems, composed of sovereign states, that take decisions on the basis of unanimity but do not act directly upon the people In other words: a confederation is simply an international intergovernmental organization — albeit, as some scholars emphasize, one that is not confined to only one goal The Belgian case is a perfect illustration.
Apparently, then, there is a category in between the Hamiltonian federations and confederations, which traditional theory is not able to grasp.
Moreover, as soon as the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA put confederalism on the political agenda, a highly topical debate arose on the definition of confederations. According to the N-VA, a confederation does not necessarily imply separatism 28 , whereas scholars, clinging to traditional theory, maintain that it does, since confederations imply the collaboration of sovereign states The academic view, then, expects a clear-cut constitutional moment — the act of separation — before the system can transform from one form of state into a very different one.
This fails to grasp the dynamics that brought about a gradual shift from a unitary state to an ever looser multi-tiered system. It is, in particular, not helpful for the Belgian debate, as it is not sufficiently specific to identify at which stage the Belgian system is transformed to the point that it is a confederation, rather than a federation, in the absence of a separatist seizure. Moreover, since it covers a very broad set of multi-tiered arrangements, it is not able to capture the dynamics of transforming forms of state at all.
This, however, brings us back to the problems identified when discussing the Hamiltonian approach. Also, it shifts the focus on a typology of institutional manifestations of the federal principle, thereby drawing us into debates over categorization, that leads us astray from the concrete political problems that federalism is expected to deal with In Belgium, this means that the focus on whether confederalism is a synonym for separatism, is an obstacle for discussing what really is at stake: how to organize the Belgian system in such a way that it can accommodate the different preferences of national groups while keeping these groups committed to the integrity of the system as a whole.
Only if this proves impossible, separation becomes an issue that needs serious consideration. In his theory, federalism is a process that may go either direction, towards joint arrangements, or towards differentiation This dynamic view allows for institutional diversity and is able to accommodate new trends.
It was criticized for its vagueness as to how to identify a federal system and as to how process and structure are related Friedrich draws no sharp line between forms of state. All depends on the balance between unity and differentiation 40 , but no indication is provided as to what this balance entails exactly. Also, the impression arose that federal organisations are the endpoint of the process 41 , which ignores the fact that fragmenting systems such as Belgium may continue to devolve, even after they have become federal organisations.
This way, it underestimates the risk that this process may lead to the dissolution of a political system. Finally, the gliding scale gives the impression that federalism is merely a matter of degree of centralisation or decentralisation. This has been picked up in the literature on decentralisation, but debates have remained on how federalism as the institutional arrangement of an entire system relates to decentralisation as a degree of autonomous powers More recently, the focus on dynamics of federalism has returned in federalism studies to examine how federal systems adapt to new circumstances and to respond to societal problems Yet, what is still missing is a snapshot of the institutional framework against which change can be measured and compared.
The theory of dynamic federalism adopts the focus on dynamic processes, as well as the balance between unity and territorial diversity as the core of federalism. For Mueller, finding this balance is the key to success for MTSs First, it is not the middle point on a continuum between centralization and decentralization, as it is usually conceived Instead, it points to the proportion of centralization on the one hand, and of cohesiveness on the other.
Each component can be given different value, as long as, following the definition of a federalist political organization, some core of autonomy and interdependence is secured.
Consequently, balance does not imply immobility, as both King and Burgess claimed 48 : what is considered the optimal balance, can change over time. Hence, the question is not where the key to success lies for all federalist organizations, but what proportion of institutional cohesion and autonomy is optimal for a given society.
Autonomy is the ability of subnational entities to organise themselves, make their own decisions, and secure their interests in central decision-making. Cohesion aims at securing the integrity of the entire system, for example by voicing the general interest that transcends the separate territorial interests, by establishing instruments that further the creation of a common public sphere and inter-regional solidarity, or by advancing commitment of territorial representatives to the general interest.
Yet, federal theory is too often concentrated on the degree of subnational autonomy self-rule and representation shared rule. By contrast, the urgent question whether federalism can also help to maintain the cohesiveness of a multinational democracy, as posed by Gagnon and Tremblay 50 , is neglected. Shared rule, moreover, is most often regarded as a way to secure autonomy within federal decision-making, rather than as a means to build cohesion. There is a difference.
For example, autonomy is best secured if the subnational entity has an individual veto right in federal decision-making processes, but the federal decision-making process is more cohesive if all subnational entities together have a collective veto right that requires them to enter into a dialogue. It depends on the purpose of the form of state, and societal, economic, political and geographical factors. For multinational MTSs, finding the proper balance is especially challenging because they endeavour to manage conflicts that are generated by distrust in the central government perceived as serving exclusive rather than inclusive interests I will explain these fundamentals briefly, as there is no room here to go into detail Usually, safeguards are institutionalized to protect this federalist arrangement.
Contestation can take place outside of the constitutional boundaries, but it is also an inherent and crucial part of the institutional arrangement.
Constitutions are conceived as providers of instruments that are capable of recalibrating power relations when new developments put at risk important values, such as efficient government, the survival of the state, or group identity. Such instruments — hubs for change — are necessary to address instability that occurs when the division of powers and resources in an MTS is no longer accepted as legitimate by political actors at the different levels The capacity to respond to change, then, is regarded as an important factor for the survival of MTSs.
A centralist system can develop instruments to bring territorial groups together in such a way that they transcend group interests, it can organize power sharing instruments in such a way that central decisions are the sum of group interests, or it can ignore territorial interests all together. In the first case the centralist system is also cohesive, in the last case it is not. This brings us to the categorization of forms of state.
Meanwhile, the discussion under section 4. This means that this theory does not use a gliding scale to picture forms of state, but rather a checker board, where systems can move up or downwards, to the left or the right, or diagonally, as visualized in table 1.
Table 1. Forms of state. Political associations are systems that score low cohesion and high subnational autonomy. Intergovernmental international organisations would most likely fall under this category, but since sovereignty or independence is not a defining property, very loose political systems that are no international organisations may also get ranked under this label. They represent two schools of thought with different recipes for accommodating ethnic groups in divided societies Centripetalists favor an integrative, cross-community model, whereas consociationalists argue for guaranteed group representation and prefer a model where the members of the governing bodies remain firmly rooted in their separate subgroup.
The second model is considered less cohesive in table 1 because it encourages group mobilization. In divided societies, these sub-groups are not necessarily concentrated within a specific territory Considering that this scheme is only concerned with territorial divided MTSs, it only addresses those systems where the main groups largely overlap with territorial delineations.
For this purpose, autonomy and cohesion indexes must be developed, that examine institutional arrangements not in a search for defining properties, but for indicators that point to, respectively, autonomy and cohesion.
So far, rough indicators for autonomy had already been developed 61 , but indicators for cohesion were absent. Elsewhere, I have developed a comprehensive set of indicators for both The set consists of 16 tables to measure autonomy and 16 tables to measure cohesion in the dimensions of status, powers and fiscal arrangements.
Autonomy and cohesion tables in the dimension of status are linked with the different levels of authority: central and subnational constitutions, the legislative level, the executive level, international and supranational decision-making, and judicial organization.
Under fiscal arrangements, the cohesion index concentrates on equalization mechanisms and other measures to promote solidarity and partnership, whereas the autonomy index is mostly interested in revenue and spending powers and discusses subnational taxes, borrowing powers, shared tax revenues, conditional grants and fiscal discipline rules.
This means that a political system can be ranked in several categories at the same time, for example in asymmetrical arrangements, or when local and regional entities are compared. This way, the model captures the complexity that characterizes multi-tiered systems in practice. First, it unravels semantic discussions about the meaning of confederalism, which is the subject of heated political and social debate. Next, it explains the continuous process of change.
And finally, it raises the question of whether constitutional engineering is apt to turn the tide that brings Belgium to the brink of dissolution. According to traditional theory, it does, since confederations are essentially forms of state where independent, sovereign states collaborate. Confederations are systems that score high for autonomy and medium for cohesion.
This means that the system predominantly invests in instruments that secure the autonomy of subnational entities, and is interested in consociationalist rather than integrationist power sharing instruments. Lack of space obliges me to refer to the book for more detail. The results are presented in table 2. The indexes still have to be validated through academic debate and applications to several country studies.
This is work in progress. Therefore I do not simply present the results in table 2 as a given, but will also refer to smaller but more established indexes for autonomy, and in particular to the Regional Authority Index RAI developed by Hooghe et al. The Flemish Community is selected because, since the merger of Community and Region institutions, it is the largest subnational entity.
For contrast, the small German-Speaking Community is selected as well. Table 2. Autonomy and Cohesion in Belgium. By contrast, the German-speaking Community has a score of only This is higher than the scores of Austria 18,5 or India 23 , close to the scores for Australia and Germany 26 , although much lower than the scores for Switzerland 29 , Canada 29,5 or the US On a scale from 0 to 1, the Flemish Community has a score of 0.
Here, the index shows that autonomy is highest in the dimension of powers. The index also allows us to measure constitutional asymmetry — in this case 0. Constitutional asymmetry points to the differences in autonomy with regard to status, powers and fiscal arrangements To appreciate this score, we need to compare with other asymmetrical systems.
This is different from the standpoint of the German-Speaking Community, which, in terms of dynamic federalism, comes down to a regionalized system. This means that Belgium is at the same time a confederation and a regionalized system, depending on the unit of analysis.
For this, we need to take a closer look at the proposal as developed in its congress documents Flanders and Wallonia can decide to jointly exercise some of these competences when this is in the interest of each individual entity. This means that the proposal opts for high autonomy and low cohesion — which brings the system in the category of a political association. The conclusion is that the N-VA proposal, indeed, implies a radical shift, bringing the Belgian system to a completely different category.
Using the term confederalism for both, only creates confusion. These scholars were mainly interested in social, economic and political forces. By contrast, not much light has been shed on institutional instruments as drivers for change. Yet, most likely, constitutional provisions influence the conduct of political actors, and in this way cause their own processes of constitutional change Among these instruments are the amendment procedures for constitutional revision, the technique for the allocation of powers, judicial and political instruments for the adjudication of power conflicts, and global governance.
Still, the core of the federal institutional arrangements, such as the organisation of the Communities and Regions, powers and fiscal arrangements are de-constitutionalized in laws that give the major language groups a veto right, but leaves the German-Speaking Community aside. The result is that even if the constitution is locked, state reforms are still possible through organic special majority laws.
If we view this from the perspective of dynamic federalism, based on indicators of autonomy and cohesion, what we see is that some important safeguards for autonomy are inserted in the constitution: the recognition of the Communities and Regions, their representation in the Senate, the veto rights and government parity for the two major language groups that largely overlap with the Flemish Community on one side, and the French Community and Walloon Region on the other, and the principle of exclusive competences.
But even if the constitution is locked, it is still possible to make a shift towards more autonomy. In theory, ordinary and special majority laws can be used to make a shift towards more cohesion and less autonomy: for example, the enumeration of Community and Region competences can be reduced, or the fiscal arrangements can secure a financial distribution system based on enhanced solidarity.
However, considering the constitutional framework and the dyadic and consociational process for change, in the hands of both major language groups that are accountable only to the electorate within their own language communities, it is more likely that the outcome of negotiations lead to more autonomy and less cohesion.
This is what we have witnessed throughout six state reforms, which brought ever more autonomy, and no or little care for cohesive instruments. Typically, this is the institutional device for dual states 71 , in recognition of subnational autonomy and equality. Shared powers are either framework powers or concurrent powers. Georges Van Den Abbeele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Only days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam, one of the Belgian-based organizers of the Paris attacks in November , Brussels was rocked by two suicide attacks that killed more than 30 people and injured more than The bombings have called attention to the crisis of security across Europe in the face of terrorism and radicalization. But the incidents also add color to the image of Belgium — my native country — as a failed nation-state, one that seems egregiously incapable of protecting its own people.
It stems from a century or more of determined and well-organized efforts to weaken the national state in favor of local control over almost all decision-making. Though we share a country geographically smaller than the greater New York metropolitan area, we are a nation of polyglots, and most of us speak not only French and Dutch, but also English, German and other languages besides.
Historically a border region situated between France and the Netherlands and ruled by the royal Habsburg family , modern Belgium first emerged as an independent entity in Anti-Dutch sentiment, fuelled by both religious and linguistic differences, led to the revolt of , which created the current nation-state of Belgium. In the 19th century, French reigned; it was spoken in the wealthy coal-rich south, and was the preferred idiom of the Francophilic bourgeois elite.
But in the 20th century the situation was reversed. Mines in the French speaking Wallonian south became depleted and left endemic unemployment and poverty, while a commercial boom in the Dutch-speaking north empowered Flemish pride and linguistic assertiveness.
The German occupations during the two World Wars encouraged and exacerbated these rifts through calculated strategies of divide-and-rule , encouraging linguistic nationalist movements.
Only the nine central communes of Brussels are officially bilingual, and one small eastern part of the country is officially German-speaking. Today, demographic data about who actually speaks which language are almost impossible to come by, since the Belgian constitution effectively stipulates that language follows region.
In reality, we have families that readily straddle the supposed linguistic border between the regions.
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